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development disCourses on the tibetan 
plateau: urbanization and expropriation oF 
Farmland in dartsedo
The term “development” defines the Chinese official discourse on Tibet and Tibetans. Officials speak of de-
velopment in symbolic and practical terms as it serves the overall policy strategy towards Tibet. This paper 
examines the meaning of development in the context of encounters between government officials and local 
residents in Dartsedo (Chin.:Kangding) in Eastern Tibet over a new town project. Because urbanization has 
been portrayed as the driving force of growth and development in Tibetan areas, this paper investigates the 
implementation of such an initiative. I argue that project implementation on the ground stands in sharp 
contrast to the language of “people first” and “scientific” development in the official discourse. Furthermore, 
I argue that the discrepancies between rhetoric and reality have led to a series of socio-economic problems 
for the relocated farmers.
INTRODUCTION
Urban areas in China, including Tibet, have grown 
rapidly since the 1980s (Yeh 2008). The government 
and, to an extent, the academic community in China, 
have largely overlooked the implication of rapid ur-
banization for the millions of farmers or villagers who 
have been “legally or illegally” made landless over the 
years. They have been officially categorized as “land-
lost farmers” (shidinongmin) who lost their land, es-
pecially in peri-urban villages, due to urbanization 
and real estate development. The population of land-
lost farmers was 40 to 50 million in 2005, although 
this figure does not include farmers who have moved 
illegally (Zhao 2005). According to official statistics, 
three million people become land-lost farmers ev-
ery year in China. The total number is expected to 
double in 2020 with the current pace of urbaniza-
tion (Zhao 2005). The official media, both national 
and local, frequently carries news of how well “land-
lost farmers” have been compensated in the form of 
education, health and employment benefits (Sichuan 
News Online 2009).
The urbanization rate has grown steadily in the 
18 counties of Ganzi (Tib.:Kardze) Tibetan Autono-
mous Prefecture, including Kangding, from 15.8 per-
cent in 2004 to 21 percent in 2010, according to local 
government reports (Ganzi Prefecture Government 
2004, 2010). In Kangding, the urbanization rate 
had already reached 39 percent in 2002 (Kangding 
County Government 2005). Indeed, development 
and investment have brought economic opportuni-
ties, modern infrastructure, and an increased flow of 
goods and capital into the region. However, for some, 
the intervention has resulted in the creation of de-
pendence due to the low priority given to local par-
ticipation and empowerment through such facilities 
as education, science, technology, and public health 
(see Gele, Zhuoma, and Lumei 2006; Demurger et 
al. 2002). At the same time, cities such as Lhasa and 
Kangding have increasingly been populated by Chi-
nese migrants from impoverished regions.
URBANIZATION: RE-TERRITORIALIZING 
TIBETAN SPACE
Emily Yeh and Mark Henderson (2008) describe 
urbanization in Tibet as a “process of deterritorializa-
tion and reterritorialization of a westward-expanding 
Han China.” Urbanization has not only brought about 
economic growth, urban infrastructure, and popula-
tion increase but at the same time a reorganization 
of the traditional Tibetan cultural landscape. In other 
words, it involves a re-appropriation of both physical 
and socio-cultural space in order to serve government 
objectives. Nyiri (2006) illustrates how the Chinese 
state draws on cultural history to produce “scenic 
spots” across the country. In contrast to the construc-
tion of sites in mainland China, newly created Tibet-
an scenic spots appear to lack local cultural history, 
but are constructed in tune with the popular imagi-
nation of the Tibetan periphery. This raises the ques-
tion of what rapid “development” and urbanization 
could mean for the peripheral Tibetan or non-Tibetan 
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Wangdui (2010) argue, is a government attempt to buy loy-
alty from the Tibetans in order to bring stability to the region. 
However, the project has been subject to criticism from rights 
group such as the Human Rights Watch (2006) over its strict 
specifications and the mortgage burden it imposes on rural 
Tibetan households.
This article builds on the work of the aforementioned 
scholars, and explores how the macro-level, top-down, and 
monolithic development discourse has come to terms with 
the issues of livelihood and local empowerment in Kang-
ding. Yeh’s (2007) insightful work on the use of “quality” and 
“backwardness” in official development discourse shows that 
development idioms are not only “merely cultural” constructs 
but have also been shaped by specific national and regional 
development policies. However, the meaning of “develop-
ment” as used in official discourse and, to some extent, in 
academic literature on China appears to be taken for granted.
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
I examine in this article how government officials as well 
as local residents in Kangding invoke the concept of “devel-
opment.” Looking only into the quantitative data of income 
and subsidies may not be sufficient to characterize develop-
ment in the region. A qualitative inquiry into how develop-
ment as a concept has been interpreted, experienced, and ne-
gotiated can complement the analysis of the official statistics 
and surveys. Towards this end, the article draws theoretical 
and methodological inspiration from post-modern theorists. 
In his groundbreaking book on development, Ferguson 
(1994:17) argues that development in Lesotho failed because 
of the conceptual gap between policy makers and reality on 
the ground. In the process, bureaucratic state power expand-
ed. Ferguson treats the failure of development as an “anthro-
pological puzzle” that needs to be solved through contextual-
ization of development discourse, which comprises a complex 
web of stated goals, unstated intentions, and unintended out-
comes. Similarly, Escobar (1995) defines development as a 
social construct embedded within a web of institutions and 
power relations, and thus better approached as discourse. 
Discourses of development are systematic constructions and 
representations of subjects, dominant and dominated actors. 
Such a critical outlook on development provides a theoretical 
foundation to analyze the discourse of development in Tibet, 
but is by no means a rejection of development as such. On the 
contrary, development as a set of practices cannot be consid-
ered devoid of historically evolved institutions, norms, and 
discourses (Rist 1997). Development actors are located with-
in their own respective life-worlds and discursive domains. 
Thus, development policy and practice can be approached 
by exploring “how discrepancies of social interest, cultural 
interpretation, knowledge, and power are mediated at critical 
points of confrontation and linkage” (Long 1999: 21). Draw-
ing on this perspective, I will examine how local officials de-
fine, practice, and represent development in the process of a 
project intervention, and how villagers of Simaqiao experi-
residents. In his seminal book on economic growth and dis-
crimination in Tibet, Fischer (2005) argues that the current 
top-down and urban-biased state development investment 
model has resulted in the further marginalization of Tibetans, 
who inhabit mainly rural areas. In contrast, official cadres and 
Han migrants living in Tibet’s urban areas are among the first 
beneficiaries of development. Drawing on Fischer’s (2005) 
ideas, Yeh (2006) argues that while greenhouse projects in 
Lhasa have significantly expanded the production of vegeta-
bles, these developments have not benefitted local Tibetans 
due to a lack of flexibility and sensitivity in the government 
policy about the structural and cultural context of develop-
ment and livelihood. Quantitative surveys carried out by Hu 
(2003) also show that migrants in Lhasa (mainly from Sich-
uan and Gansu) have substantially benefitted from the state 
development drive, whereas Tibetans lag behind in terms of 
education and employment opportunities.
The official discourse of development in Tibet portrays a 
rosy picture. It does so primarily through official figures on 
macro-level growth (see State Council 2009). There has been 
little dispute regarding the rapid economic growth and urban-
ization that have taken place during the last two decades in 
Tibet. Nevertheless, the distribution of development benefits 
have become a key issue in research on contemporary Tibet, 
as I have discussed in this paper. This marginalization, I would 
argue, is mainly due to the existing power relations between 
development actors implementing government interventions. 
A caveat is that this does not mean Tibetans have not benefit-
ted at all from the current development drive. The fact that 
rural Tibetans get access to comparatively better goods and 
infrastructure such as electricity, TV, mobile phones, modern 
transportation, and housing are obvious signs of development 
as understood in official discourse. Rather, the concern here is 
how “development” as a concept, discourse, policy, and value 
has been practiced, experienced, and understood by policy-
makers and locals alike during the implementation of devel-
opment projects. This paper examines the extent to which 
policy-makers achieve their objectives while locals abide by 
the official definition of development in order to make the 
best of it.
In their field studies of rural households in Shigatse Pre-
fecture, Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui (2010) argue that, 
far from being marginalized, Tibetan farmers have benefitted 
from the trickle-down effects of the “people-first” develop-
ment drive. They report that approximately 46.9 percent of 
the villagers in their survey received between 10,000 and 
20,000 yuan for the construction of new houses, thanks to 
the “comfortable housing program.” The government subsidy 
constitutes between 15 and 20 percent of the cost of a new 
house. Official TAR sources state that, by the end of 2010, 
the government would provide 80 percent of the region’s ru-
ral households with subsidies of between 10,000 and 25,000 
yuan (Xinhua 2009). The housing program has been praised 
in the official media as a “project of the people” aimed at im-
proving their livelihood. This program, Goldstein, Childs and 
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ence, articulate, and respond to this intervention.
A NEW KANGDING AND THE FATE OF SIMAQIAO
Simaqiao (Tib.:tsamchusampa) was one of seven villages 
in the township of Yulin (one of 18 townships in Kangding 
County). The village used to be a small and fertile peri-urban 
village on the outskirts of Kangding. The villagers harvested 
vegetables two to three times a year, which they sold in the 
town market. There were approximately 144 households with 
400 people in total. However, in 2004, the Kangding govern-
ment decided to erect a new town on village farmland with 
approval and funding from the Sichuan provincial govern-
ment. The project area stretched beyond the village boundary 
to include land of two neighbouring villages. As a result, the 
local government relocated 800 villagers in 177 households.
The county government appoints the township and village 
leaders. A relatively rich Han villager was appointed as the 
head of the Simaqiao village committee along with six com-
mittee members. 
There were no 
official records of 
the village’s pop-
ulation by eth-
nicity, although 
almost every vil-
lager possesses an 
ID card indicating 
his or her ethnic 
identity. Accord-
ing to villagers 
whom I inter-
viewed, however, 
the Tibetan and 
Han populations 
were roughly 60 
and 40 percent 
re spec t i ve l y, 
divided among 
Tibetan Buddhists, Catholics, and nonbelievers. Simaqiao was 
the only Christian community in the region with a century-
old church located in the heart of the village. A Christian mis-
sionary constructed the church in the nineteenth century. The 
local government, however, approved the demolishing of the 
church, along with other village houses. The villagers mostly 
speak the Sichuanese dialect while Tibetan is used only in 
some private homes. Many residents, particularly young vil-
lagers, are ethnically Tibetan but cannot speak Tibetan.
There were 1,598 mu (about 106.5 hectares) of cultivable 
farmland in Simaqiao Township, with 1,744 farmers includ-
ing 1,126 Tibetans and 609 Han (Kangding County History 
1997:15). Interviewees estimated their total household in-
come prior to relocation to be roughly 20-30,000 yuan per 
year. This exceeds the income of two people engaged in full-
time work as self-employed taxi drivers in the town. Accord-
ing to official data, the average rural net-income per person in 
2005 within the prefecture was 1,310 yuan (Ganzi Yearbook 
2006: 87). After the 1980s, the production of vegetables in-
creased significantly, thanks to the introduction of “scientific” 
cultivation methods. By 1997, the annual production of veg-
etables per mu was around 3,000-4,000 kilograms. The total 
agricultural production of Yulin reached 3,000 tons, generat-
ing a total cash income of between 1.5 and 2 million yuan 
(Kangding County History 1997: 14). 
The average annual income from vegetable sales alone was 
around 1,300 yuan per person in the village. Income from 
animal husbandry and the harvest of medicinal plants such 
as caterpillar fungus were not included. They constitute at 
least 40 percent of rural income in the Tibet Autonomous 
Region (Winkler 2008). According to 2005 data, there was an 
increase in productivity of 5.8 percent in the primary sector 
compared to the previous year. In 2010, the average increase 
in vegetable prices was 16 percent (Sichuan Price Online 
2010). Considering the increasing trend in productivity and in 
commodity pric-
es, income from 
vegetable sales of 
a household with 
7-8 members 
would be 15,000 
and 20,000 yuan. 
In other words, 
the villagers’ own 
estimation of 
their income pri-
or to the project 
was, more or less, 
in accordance 
with the official 
figures. The eco-
nomic viability of 
their cash crop-
based livelihoods 
was one of the 
main reasons why the urbanization project met with opposi-
tion.
METHOD AND THE FIELD-SITE
Simaqiao was the main site of my fieldwork, although I 
also interviewed informants from outside the village. I con-
ducted in-depth interviews in 30 households and with 10 
individual villagers. In addition, there were 40 local govern-
ment officials from various work units, including the village 
leader. Interviews typically lasted more than two hours, in-
cluded formal questions and informal interactions. House-
hold interviews were conducted in such a way that members, 
including household heads, sat together when responding 
to questions. In some cases, I interviewed members of the 
same household repeatedly. I also had the opportunity, for-
mally and informally, to interact with many locals in the old 
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 WHY URBANIZATION?
Kangding County government has aimed primarily to 
provide residential and nonresidential space for local commu-
nist party, military, government (dangzheng jiguan), and pub-
lic institution staff (Ganzi Prefecture Government 2007). The 
total investment in the new town had reached approximately 
800 million yuan by the time it was completed (ibid). The 
project thus constituted a significant amount of investment to 
the local economy equivalent to 13 years of the county’s rev-
enue (Ganzi Yearbook 2006). Mining, hydropower, and tour-
ism are the main sources of revenue for the prefecture govern-
ment. In this context, the construction of the new town is part 
of a broader development campaign not only to urbanize and 
extract natural resources but also to build up local govern-
ment institutions (Yang 2007). 
The local government had internally begun discussing the 
idea of the New Kangding Town project some years prior to 
the construction in May 2005. Two months before the con-
struction began, most of the villagers had moved out, with 
their farmlands expropriated. Once a “backward” village, Si-
maqiao was now perceived to be “developed.” The construc-
tion was subsequently portrayed as part of campaigns such 
as the “Scientific Development View” in 2003 (kexue fazhan 
guan) and the “New Socialist Village” in 2005 (shehui zhuyi 
xinnongcun) and “Develop the People, Stabilize Kham” in 
2007 (fumin ankang). At the heart of “scientific development” 
lies the idea of “people first” (renweiben), meaning the inter-
est and the voice of the people are to be safeguarded in the 
“development” process. The “new socialist village” aims to 
“develop” a backward production system, modernize farm-
ers, and “stabilize” backward villages in order to raise family 
incomes. The underlying assumption is that local villagers are 
of “low quality” (suzhidi) and have a “backward mentality” 
(sixiang luohou), which have been singled out as the principal 
causes for the aforementioned problems. In accordance with 
this discursive representation, the government thus launched 
the “three rurals” (sannong) program to end the “chronic 
problems of poverty” facing rural villagers.
THE OFFICIAL RATIONALE OF DEVELOPMENT
In 2006, Li Peixue, the head of Kangding County and 
Chen Nanqiao of the China Power group— a Taiwan-based 
real estate development company—signed a formal invest-
ment contract (Chang 2006) paving the way for the com-
pany to invest in Ganzi. The head of the provincial Taiwan 
Affairs Office attended the meeting along with the prefecture 
leadership. According to the contract, the latter was to invest 
300 million yuan to construct the commercial district and 
the pedestrian street of the planned town while the county 
government was to provide village farmland for construction. 
Chengdu Sanjian, one of the largest construction companies 
in Sichuan, was contracted to complete the project.
A few months later, the prefecture government made an 
official statement on its website outlining the project’s ratio-
nale (Ganzi Administration Online 2007), and circulated it 
town, including several well-educated residents.1 Fieldwork 
in Ganzi and Yushu occurred between June and September 
2007. Political unrest in the region prevented access in 2008. 
Nevertheless, I have through telephone and electronic com-
munication followed development in the region during the 
last three years.
Officially, Kangding has 113,238 permanent residents, 
including 106,474 people with local household registration 
(hukou). The county has 70,641 Tibetans, 34,132 Han, and 
1,701 members belonging to other ethnic groups living on 
11,600 square kilometres (Ganzi Yearbook 2006). The old 
Kangding town (2.3 km2) became one of the most densely 
populated places in China and the world, with 26,000 resi-
dents per km2 (Ganzi Prefecture Government 2008). One rea-
son could be the unique location of Kangding, which is sur-
rounded by steep mountains that sandwich the town. There 
is thus not enough space for the growing population. On the 
other hand, with its relatively low altitude of 2,500 meters 
and its proximity to metropolitan Chengdu, Kangding pro-
vides easy access to migrants and tourists alike. Thus, high 
population density was stated as an important reason why a 
new town was needed to catalyze development.
In 2005, the total production output in the county was 
660 million yuan, an increase of 20 percent from the previ-
ous year. The increases found were 5.8, 44, and 10 percent in 
the agricultural, industrial, and tertiary sectors, respectively 
(Ganzi Yearbook 2006: 295). The increase in the industrial 
sector indicates the current influx of investment by mining 
and hydro companies. In 2005, the secondary sector consti-
tuted 44 percent and the tertiary sector 43 percent of the lo-
cal economy, with the agricultural sector constituting the rest 
(ibid.).
When I first arrived in Kangding for fieldwork in the sum-
mer of 2007, much of the relocation issue remained “unset-
tled.” The majority of the 800 villagers had already moved 
into new apartments but were complaining to the construc-
tion companies and the local government about construction 
defects, which residents were eager to show me. In addition, 
there were dozens of villagers living in improvised roadside 
settlements. They either refused to move into the new apart-
ments or did not receive one, and some protests occurred 
outside the newly built apartment blocks. During my field-
work, the construction of the planned town was under full 
swing, and some roadside shops near the apartment blocks 
were already finished. Larger buildings were halfway through 
construction. 
In contrast, local officials whom I interviewed projected 
a bright picture of the new town plan. According to them, 
villagers were compensated generously by the government. 
Nevertheless, the controversy between the construction com-
panies, whom the county government contracted to build the 
new apartments, local government, and the villagers, was on-
going when I arrived and remained so until I left Kangding.
1. All names in this article are pseudonyms.
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widely through the official media, especially official Internet 
sites. The goals of the new Kangding town plan were primar-
ily to “safeguard the unification of the motherland [weihu 
zuguo tongyi] and stabilize the situation in Tibetan regions” 
(wending zangqujushi). Being the political, cultural, and eco-
nomic centre of Ganzi Prefecture, Kangding has occupied a 
strategic position (zhanlue yaodi) in the maintenance of “sta-
bility” and “governance” of Tibetan regions as a whole. The 
development of a strong local government has always been 
the main concern behind official development campaigns and 
policies in western China since the 2000s and even before 
(Demurger 2002).
Promoting economic development was the plan’s second 
major goal. Official discourse portrayed the urbanization proj-
ect as necessary to solidify Kangding’s “strategic position in 
ecological and cultural tourism in Western China.” The gov-
ernment, therefore, intends to construct the new town “scien-
tifically” with “local cultural characteristics,” and “unearth the 
romantic culture of folk music” (wajue qinge wenhua). The 
plan was thus to construct not only a new town but also a 
tourist destination similar to ethnic theme parks, tourist sites 
or “scenic spots” elsewhere in minority regions (Nyiri 2006). 
The plan was to “theme” the new town in order to attract 
tourists, increase property values, and bring certain messages 
to the public eye. On construction site walls large charac-
ters reading “ethnic unity” (minzutuanjie), “social harmony” 
(shehui hexian), and development (fazhan) were written in 
Chinese. The town was intended to house 100–120,000 new 
residents (Ganzi Administration Online 2007). The county 
officials explained that, in addition to social stability and 
population reduction, the commoditization of local Tibetan 
culture would not only “preserve” but also “develop” it.
The government’s development discourse thus invoked 
an array of concepts that closely paralleled the international 
discourse. Concurrently, the government’s rhetoric could be 
distinguished from the “global” discourse of development, 
and could thereby be regarded as “uniquely Chinese.”  Urban-
ization and industrialization had always been understood as 
the main priorities of development in official discourse (Chen 
2004; Yeung, Jin, and Zeng 2004). Based on the local govern-
ment’s statements on the project, the development interven-
tions in Kangding had multiple dimensions and purposes. 
Questions of social stability, economic growth, demographic 
accommodation, and modernization are all built-in goals of 
new Kangding town’s construction.
The relocation of Simaqiao’s villagers was barely men-
tioned in the statement. The only village-related information 
stated that the work related to relocation including school en-
rolment for children, social insurance, unemployment insur-
ance, and other benefits had been “successfully completed” 
(shunli wancheng). The villagers found themselves powerless 
before the powerful official development campaign. Their 
only option was to ensure that the government delivered on 
its promises. In official discourse, urbanization has come to 
mean, among other things, the construction of modern infra-
structure coupled with migration, whereas industrialization 
has been mainly about the extraction of natural resources. If 
urbanization was to be understood as the driving force for 
development, how had this socioeconomic and political proj-
ect been experienced, contested, and negotiated? How has 
the transformation of Simaqiao into a new town affected the 
livelihood of villagers? An investigation of local villagers’ ex-
perience of project implementation illuminates what develop-
ment means on the ground.
LAND EXPROPRIATION: PROMISES OF A BETTER 
FUTURE  
In summer 2004, a delegation of Kangding County, town-
ship, and village-level officials, including the deputy party 
secretary Huang, accompanied by the village leader, Tan, 
came to Simaqiao. These are the key state bureaucratic in-
stitutions responsible for any policy implementation in rural 
China. The purpose was to inform villagers about the plan to 
turn their village into a “modern” town. The villagers were 
shocked that the county government had decided to build a 
new town on their farmland. Many whom I interviewed re-
ported a reaction of disbelief; they could not fathom the idea 
of moving from their age-old homes. Other concerns arose, 
including their livelihood, children’s future and so on. Many 
villagers, especially the elders, found it unbearable to give up 
farming and move into apartments. I was confronted with a 
sense of desperation and hopelessness among the relocated 
villagers. Dao, a village elder who initially opposed the plan, 
said,
We were not prepared to go from our ancestral 
home and live together in the new apartment 
blocks, but what could we, ordinary people 
[laobaixing], do? We did not have any choice 
but had to follow what came from the top. 
The government had promised that everything 
would be provided once we had moved, and we 
would then be living in paradise. 
Despite its proximity to old Kangding town, Simaqiao 
used to be what the villagers described as “a peaceful village” 
(anjing de cunzi). A 67-year villager named Cheng, who lived 
with his children and grandchildren, said everyday dealings 
(laiwang) with county-level officials prior to the project were 
relatively few, but started to change when the project began. 
Cheng was present during the meeting, and likened it to any 
other official meeting, “in which the officials had coerced 
the villagers to follow in accordance with the official policy 
imperative.” Opposition to the project during the first meet-
ings was intense. In order for the villagers to accept the plan, 
the local government packaged it with an array of promises, 
including the provision of modern block apartments. The 
apartments were between 85 and 150 square metres in size, 
and were to be of better quality than their former houses. The 
government also promised to compensate villagers 270 yuan 
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180,000 yuan per mu. However, the overwhelming majority 
of the villagers whom I interviewed opposed the plan. After 
several meetings, the local government raised the farmland 
compensation to 36,966 yuan per mu while the rest of the 
government package remained unchanged. Officials became 
increasingly frustrated and threatened to bulldoze the villag-
ers’ houses if they continued in their opposition. The villag-
ers, hardly unified, had to choose between accepting the plan 
or  continuing to engage in what many described as a “hope-
less battle” against the government. In the meantime, the local 
government launched a signature campaign and deployed a 
series of new tactics to convert the villagers.
The village committee began to recruit new party mem-
bers. One notable reinterpretation of what it meant to be a 
communist party member was to obey party decisions. Ac-
cording to Dao, new party members were pushed to accede to 
this in order to convince others to follow. Party membership 
provided a network of relations with other party members, 
including the village leader. Such connections later proved 
useful in getting apartments, construction jobs, and other 
benefits of development. After the recruitment, the village of-
ficials cajoled the families and friends of new party members 
into accepting the plan. Another tactic, according to the vil-
lagers, was to spread rumors saying the majority of the vil-
lagers had signed in favor of the plan when, in fact, this was 
not the case. Thus, it prompted a number of households to 
give up their opposition. Ultimately, with various tactics and 
forceful language, the local government removed the villagers 
from their homes and farmlands in March 2005. As a result, 
Simaqiao villagers joined millions of other “land-lost farmers” 
in China.
According to the villagers the Kangding government re-
sold the expropriated agricultural land (around 400 mu) for 
400,000 yuan per mu. Villagers cited this when they com-
plained about the corruption of local officials. Nevertheless, 
the head of the local Bureau of Land told me that the govern-
ment had sold to the China Power group 190 mu of land at 
around 200,000 yuan per mu. The government contracted 
the rest of the land to Chengdu Sanjian. The gap between 
the officially stated price and that mentioned by the villagers 
was significant and impossible to verify. However, based on 
its own figures, the local government earned a net-profit of at 
least 70 million yuan through the sale of Simaqiao’s farmland 
to the investors alone. The villagers received only 18 percent 
of the market price as compensation for their land; the rest 
went to the local government. Later, the construction compa-
nies resold newly constructed apartments to the local govern-
ment at a market price of 3,600 yuan per square meter. It is 
obvious who has benefitted from the land expropriation and 
urbanization project.
LIFE IN THE NEW COMMUNITY: DEVELOPMENT AS 
“COMFORTABLE HOUSES”
The government paid villagers a “transitional compensa-
tion” (guodufei) of 150 yuan per head per month in 2005 to 
per square metre of their old houses, and the opportunity to 
buy a 22-square meter shop space in the new town to secure 
future incomes. They were also offered 10,000 yuan per mu 
of farmland. The government promised to build one school 
within the new town for village children and promised that 
villagers older than 60 would receive old-age subsidies along 
with benefits for the unemployed. According to village infor-
mants, they were also promised minimum living insurance 
as urban residents (chengshi jumin dibao). The promises, ac-
cording to the village informants, were too good to be true. 
In the midst of villagers’ scepticism the government promises 
brought a sense of curiosity and excitement of living in a new 
town without the hard labor to which they were accustomed. 
The plan was also discussed in the media and official policy 
meetings as part of the policy to eradicate the “difficult” liveli-
hood problems of rural villages.
The transformation of the village into a town in which 
residents would enjoy the benefits of modern living was spo-
ken of as the government’s mission. One county official, who 
was responsible for project implementation, summarized the 
policy, “…under the benevolence [guanghuaixia] of the party 
and the state, the county government decided to build the 
new town in Simaqiao as part of the “Open up the West” and 
the “New Socialist Village” policies. The idea was to bring 
about “new life” [xinshenghuo] to the villagers.” It was, there-
fore, crucial for the officials that the villagers buy into the 
idea and move out from the village in time. He was confident 
that the project would bring opportunities to the villagers in 
the long run, despite “temporary” problems of livelihood and 
economic grievances.
During the land expropriation, however, officials warned 
the sceptical, if not defiant, villagers about the irreversibil-
ity of the government plan since it was supported by those 
“higher-up” (shangji) and was in the “public interest” (gon-
gongliyi). It was thus “natural” for the villagers to move out 
since the state held ultimate land ownership. The local gov-
ernment had to follow proper procedures of land expropria-
tion, compensation and housing accommodations. Constitu-
tionally, the village collective has the right to use and manage 
the land. However, it has no right to transfer land for com-
pensatory use. The state may, in accordance with the con-
stitution, expropriate land under collective ownership if it is 
in the public interest (Guo 2001: 424). In theory, the local 
government did not have direct access to the farmland under 
Simaqiao village committee. According to villagers, their lead-
er, unlike elected village leaders elsewhere in China, was ap-
pointed by the township administration. In terms of housing, 
the government had planned to construct six six-storey apart-
ment blocks in the corner of the planned town. The officials 
whom I interviewed interpreted the housing construction as 
a means to provide compensation and modern accommoda-
tion for the villagers more than a means to create livelihoods, 
and thought it would effectively win over the villagers who 
had been living in “backward” conditions. Some villagers, 
however, negotiated farmland compensation and asked for 
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be temporarily settled before moving into new apartments. 
The government promised to complete these by the end of 
2005 but did not do so until 2006. The villagers’ demand 
for compensation for that year was rejected with no further 
explanation. Local officials told me that the villagers were well 
compensated. Except for a few county and village level offi-
cials, most in the local government do not have much knowl-
edge of land expropriation and compensation. Some even 
confused the transitional compensation with minimum urban 
living expenses. However, most officials were well versed in 
the relevant government policies when asked about Simaq-
iao, and projected a rosy picture of how villagers benefitted. 
To the contrary, the first year was difficult for the villagers 
who had to live on the compensation fund, as town residents 
without farm work. As Wang, a 57-year old villager said,“...in 
the beginning, we thought that the compensation we received 
for our land was an enormous amount. However, once we 
began to live in the town, we discovered that it was nothing 
compared to the high-living expenses in the town, and after 
what we had to pay for the apartments as well.”
In late 2006 and early 2007 the relocated farmers started 
moving into new apartments that cost 850 yuan per square 
meter. While the government was to pay between 30 and 35 
percent of the total cost, the rest had to be borne by the villag-
ers. There were approximately 200 new apartments of varying 
sizes. In reality, the local government paid only 750 yuan per 
square meter when they bought them from the construction 
companies. Distribution of the apartments, however, became 
problematic. Distribution was to be based on land ownership, 
which in theory indicated the size of the family, but in reality 
other factors held sway. The family size of households has 
changed significantly since the early 1980s. This meant that 
the government could only allocate apartments to those who 
had farmland of their own prior to the project. The allocation 
rationale thus rendered many young villagers homeless since 
those born after de-collectivization in the early 1980s did not 
have land.
De-collectivization allocated farmland to households 
based on the number of family members. Village households 
in Simaqiao, like elsewhere in rural Tibet, were composed 
of three generations with many siblings who held farmland 
jointly. However, a single apartment of 95 square meters was 
not enough space for families with more than 8 members. 
They required two apartments but could only afford to buy 
one. This situation was particularly problematic for young 
people who had raised families on their parents’ farmland but 
did not have land of their own, and were typically left with-
out apartments. Furthermore, outsiders who had married 
local villagers did not have farmland and ended up without 
apartments. Taking matters into their own hands, these villag-
ers turned, individually or collectively, to the Administrative 
Committee, deputy party secretary Huang, and other orga-
nizations for help. Some even set up stands in the middle of 
community to protest when they had no options left in their 
dealings with bureaucracies. I noticed that, in spite of all the 
private criticisms, most villagers did not offer public defiance 
or protest out of fear of repercussions.
After the relocation, the villagers lived mainly on the com-
pensation fund but were unaccustomed to planning their 
household economies as town residents. This resulted in the 
unwise and sometimes unscrupulous use of the compensa-
tion fund. Previously, the villagers had enjoyed a subsistence 
livelihood. They produced many of their necessities, although 
it is difficult to put a precise cash value on farm products for 
self-consumption. In contrast, the government’s compensa-
tion appeared, at first sight, to be a large sum for the villagers. 
According to my own survey a household with 7-8 members, 
5 mu of land, and a 250 square meter house would be com-
pensated 184,830 yuan for the land (RMB 36,966/mu) and 
67,500 yuan for their house (RMB 270/meter) for a total of 
251,500 yuan. Compensation funds quickly vanished into 
housing and other expenses. Each household had to repay 
the government 56,528 yuan for the 95-square-meter apart-
ment they bought after the 30 percent government subsidy, 
and the 22-square-meter shop cost 18,700 yuan. Thus, once 
each village household with approximately 7.5 members paid 
back 75,228 yuan, they were left with a total of 176,272. It 
was all they had for the foreseeable future without farmland 
and a need to buy all their food, cover medical insurance, 
education, and other living expenses for the entire family.
Three years after expropriation, the government promises 
had not materialized. Government subsidies for unemploy-
ment, minimum living expenses for urban residents, and a 
new school were not delivered. The only promise kept was 
old-age insurance for those over 60. In interviews, some villag-
ers stated that they had misunderstood the promise as social 
security to cover the daily living expenses of this age group. 
In Kangding, 60 yuan could only buy two kilograms of pork. 
A 67-year old villager, who complained desperately about the 
relocation, said “…had I known this was what I would re-
ceive, I would never even dream of agreeing to move.” The 
language of disappointment, dispossession, and desperation 
countered the government’s discourse of development. Not 
surprisingly, the deterioration of relations between the local 
government and the villagers intensified. The villagers whom 
I interviewed blamed the local government for taking ad-
vantage of their illiteracy in national law and central govern-
ment policies. They had expropriated farmland and houses 
for very little compensation. Ironically, peoples’ livelihoods 
deteriorated compared to the “subsistence” economy prior to 
the development project. A failure of the new town plan has 
therefore been its inability to address the villagers’ livelihoods 
in the post-relocation period. There seems to have been an 
underlying assumption that the construction of a new town 
would automatically create opportunities and prosperity for 
the villagers despite there being no concrete proposals for 
how to achieve that goal.
UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE NEW COMMUNITY  
Unemployment was a serious problem within the com-
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ately looking for jobs. The low level of education and the lack 
of “guanxi” connections left them particularly vulnerable to 
discrimination in the labour market. People frequently stated 
in interviews that construction company bosses did not want 
them because outside workers were perceived as being bet-
ter “skilled” and “intelligent” than the villagers. Ironically, the 
local officials, including the village leader, believed that the 
villagers were too lazy to find jobs. According to some lo-
cal officials, the main problem was that villagers wasted their 
time drinking, playing mahjong, and watching videos.
Local officials depicted villagers as supposedly having the 
choice between work and wasting time. However, approxi-
mately 10-15 villagers worked on the construction site and 
were paid 40 Yuan per day without food and shelter, even as 
workers from the outside were paid 60 Yuan plus food and 
shelter. In TAR, Tibetan construction workers normally get 60 
Yuan per day as of 2010. Construction companies often failed 
to pay the villagers on time for this low-skilled construction 
work. Nevertheless, these jobs were rarely available for those 
willing to work. The village leader and party members, in 
cooperation with the local construction companies, were in 
control of the construction work. From time to time, the vil-
lage leader used his influence to find construction jobs for his 
relatives and friends. Regarding development an unemployed 
villager said, “Does it matter what I think about development? 
I have no land, no job, no home, no money, and no power.” 
Previously, the villagers, young and old, had enough work to 
do on their own farms. After relocation they became depen-
dent on the compensation money.
INCOME GENERATION 
Unemployment exacerbates the problem of family in-
come. However, officials from the prefecture’s Department 
of Poverty Alleviation described Simaqiao as an “exceptional 
case” (teshude) in the sense that its villagers had received gen-
erous compensation from the government. They were thus 
well-off and had no need of government support. There were, 
however, approximately ten households in Simaqiao and the 
nearby villages that received minimum life insurance prior 
to relocation. The selection of the low-income households 
(dibaohu) was said to be fair and transparent. The process was 
publicly announced and selection made through the town-
ship government and village committee. In Simaqiao, the se-
lection process was, however, far from transparent. A 34-year 
old villager, Zhaxi, described the procedure: 
… it was carried out silently. The village leader 
and his men distributed the list and selected 
their candidates. If we raised objections or sug-
gestions, they would not care much. The voice 
of the common people [laobaixing], whatever 
we do or say, does not have any weight or in-
fluence over the decisions of those in power. In 
other words, if you have power, then you have 
everything, including wealth [you quanjiu you 
munity, although the local officials did not have statistics on 
unemployment. My interview data suggests that more than 
85 percent of people aged between 16 and 60 were unem-
ployed. Previously, only a few people worked in the town, 
while most villagers engaged in cultivation. After the sudden 
relocation, most villagers found themselves without a job. 
Prior to the relocation, the local Department of Labour and 
Human Resources conducted a one-day job training for re-
located villagers but this did not result in the employment 
of any trainees afterward. During my fieldwork, there were 
many young villagers searching for employment, including 
petty jobs. Commenting on development, a 29-year-old vil-
lager said, “We had work to do before they developed us. 
After the development, we were turned into jobless beggars. 
The government promised us a “paradise”, but we have ended 
up in hell”. Another informant said, “Development must be 
good from a bigger picture [dade fangmian], but it is just not 
helping us improve our lives. It has only enriched the local 
officials and their acquaintances”. 
A former village, Simaqiao has been incorporated into 
Kangding County municipality. The overwhelming major-
ity of the villagers whom I interviewed spoke nostalgically 
about village life prior to relocation. Previously, the pressure 
for making cash income or finding employment was relatively 
low. Life in the village was more or less self-sufficient. In ad-
dition to consumption of their own farm products, villagers 
also sold produce for cash, and kept cows, sheep, pigs, and 
chickens. Despite the official discourse of the backward vil-
lage, Simaqiao’s residents were self-sufficient and had access 
to the market.
In interviews county government officials cited the Bureau 
of Human Resources and Labour as the agency responsible for 
the villagers’ employment issues. In cooperation with the vil-
lage committee and several government agencies the Human 
Resources Bureau set up an unemployment insurance fund 
in 2006. Only 112 land-lost farmers from Simaqiao and the 
neighbouring villages participated in the program, accord-
ing to the officials.  Villagers told me that they did not know 
about this program, or simply did not trust it and thought 
it was too expensive in relation to what they got in return. 
The total fund was 934,016 Yuan, including a Bureau of Fi-
nance grant of 400,000 Yuan and the contributions from the 
villagers of 534,016 Yuan. This meant that each participant 
had to pay 4,768 Yuan for one-time insurance in order to 
receive employment benefits of 3,572 Yuan from the govern-
ment (Kangba 2006). Each would thus receive 347 Yuan per 
month for two years. However, the insurance was too expen-
sive for villagers whose average wage was around 1,000 Yuan 
per month.
The local media and officials portrayed the villagers in 
glowing terms, despite the contentious situation on the 
ground. Apart from the unemployment benefits, few mecha-
nisms were in place to secure access to the labour market in 
the post-relocation period. The villagers had to find work on 
their own. Villagers frequently told me that they were desper-
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qian]. If not, you are nothing. 
During a videotaped conversation, I repeated the official 
claim of transparency and fairness to a group of young villag-
ers and met with strong dissent. A woman responded, “We 
have no land, no apartment, and no source of livelihood. Our 
lives have been virtually impoverished because of this proj-
ect.”  She dismissed the statement of transparency and high 
income as a “joke”[chuiniude] and added,“All this is just talk. 
Ultimately, it is power and nepotism that decide who gets 
what here.”
Except the monthly old-age insurance of 60 Yuan per 
person, the minimum life insurance for ten households was 
the only economic support provided by the government. Ap-
proximately 15 households in Simaqiao owned rental cars for 
driving in and out of town, mainly to the local hot spring. 
Most homeless and unemployed villagers struggled to meet 
their daily needs in the new community. Villagers often un-
derstood development as an official project designed, first and 
foremost, to strengthen the state (guojia) while the govern-
ment officials themselves become prosperous in the process.
Speaking back: The counter-discourse of development
I often asked villagers, “How is the new life?” The common 
response was “[it is a] hard life” (hen laoku), an expression 
often used in the Sichuanese dialect. They would elaborate, 
“Nowadays, we do not have land, no apartment, and not even 
a source of livelihood.” It was evident that the main grievance 
was the lack of livelihood opportunities. I then asked, “What 
about the hundreds and thousands from the compensation 
fund, and the new fancy apartments?” I even repeated what 
I heard from government officials and some town residents 
that the villagers had received about 300-400,000 Yuan from 
the government and other benefits as well, including access 
to urban facilities. The two most frequent responses I received 
were either “No, that is not true” or “Yes, that is true. We 
have received them but have spent them on the apartments in 
which we are living.” The contention then boiled down to the 
nature of the compensation.
Many villagers felt the compensation funds were only a 
trick to deceive them into accepting the government’s devel-
opment plan. The official discourse projected a bright future 
for the villagers in the new town. The villagers, in their own 
opinion, were first dispossessed of their traditional means of 
livelihood, and then eventually lost their own voice. When 
the local government was unable to fulfil its promised com-
pensation, the voices and grievances of the villagers became 
depoliticized. The local authorities characterized contention 
as a “practical or technical” problem rather than a question 
of power relations and participation. In desperation, villagers 
established their own representative group with 12 members 
who were elected to petition the local government to address 
their socioeconomic problems, above all, the loss of their 
farmland and homes. 
When asked, most villagers I interviewed defined develop-
ment as something positive, desirable, and directly related to 
the improvement of livelihood. But no one believed they had 
benefitted from such “development.” Villagers unanimously 
agreed that they were not “developed” due to the project but 
that the local officials and the state in general had become de-
veloped. When asked about development, one villager in his 
mid-30s responded, “We are not developed but impoverished 
[bianqiong le]. The state and the local officials involved in the 
project have been developed.” For the villagers, the official 
development of their centuries-old village life did not result in 
the improvement of their livelihoods and income as they had 
hoped prior to the relocation.
The villagers were deeply suspicious of the officials. Dur-
ing the farmland expropriation, the village committee, head-
ed by the village leader, played a pivotal role in mediation 
between villagers and local officials. Tan used his unique po-
sition as both a grassroots level official and a local villager to 
implement the project. He established close connections with 
his superiors such as the county party secretary and managed 
the construction work. When the project was announced, he 
was at first sympathetic to the desires of the villagers. Howev-
er, as he began to work with the county officials, he switched 
his loyalty and became the main figure in its implementation. 
He used his networks, including family relations, to get as 
many as possible to accept the plan. In a number of inter-
views, the villagers accused this village leader of corruption. 
In 2009, allegations of corruption against the village 
leader were made in a strongly worded petition in the name 
of Simaqiao’s villagers addressed to the provincial Discipline 
Inspection Bureau. The petition was blogged anonymously 
on the Internet, giving details of how the village leader and 
his fellow cadres used their power and positions to accumu-
late massive wealth (Baidu 2009). In interviews two years 
earlier, I had been told that the village leader controlled the 
construction work, including work contracts. He was accused 
of pocketing up to 30,000 Yuan from construction workers’ 
wages and the sale of materials to the construction compa-
nies. He paid less to the workers per cubic meter of sand and 
stone than they were supposed to get, and bargained for high-
er prices on these construction materials than the initial price. 
Tan was thus labelled “the land emperor” (tuhuangdi) in the 
petition, which begged the provincial authority for further in-
vestigation. As of October 2010, however, there had been no 
response from either the prefectural or provincial authorities .
The local government, after the completion of the new 
town in 2008, launched a lavish ribbon-cutting ceremony to 
inaugurate the transfer of the local party and the government 
offices into the new town. Thousands of people, including 
top officials of the prefecture, gathered to celebrate what they 
described as the successful completion of a new town within 
three years. It was interpreted as a clear sign of rapid devel-
opment in the county. This affirms what Yeh (2008) termed 
“administrative urbanization”, meaning urbanization that 
has been primarily centred on and around the development 
of state institutions rather than private enterprises. The first 
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since they had lost their homes and land to the project, and 
were not “town residents” either since they did not receive 
minimum living insurance as town residents. The official de-
velopment drive in Kangding could thus be interpreted to be 
what Hobart (1993), Baudrillard et al. (1988), and Fairhead 
(2000) have termed the “process of de-civilisation”—meaning 
the detachment of development discourse from the voice and 
philosophy of the subjects. In Kangding, the official “devel-
opment project” removed the villagers from the process of 
thinking, arguing, and acting on what defines “civilization” in 
the making of the development plan. 
The government’s priorities and goals are designed with-
in the framework of the Chinese state system, which Croll 
(1994) described as the “identifiable and the centralized 
agency of development.” This “agency” can be divided into 
central, provincial, and local prefecture, county, township and 
village levels of government. The local agents of development 
since pre-reform China were designated to adapt national 
policies to local “conditions” (ibid.). In the case of Kangding, 
the County government initially planned the project with ap-
proval from the provincial and central government. Thus, the 
idea of “local agents” only applies to the county level but not 
to the township and village. The local authorities had consult-
ed neither the villagers nor the village leader when they for-
mulated the plan to construct the new town. Far from seeing 
local villagers as active agents of change, the official discourse 
portrayed them as “backward”, “passive”, and in need of state 
intervention. In the process, it failed to take into account the 
value of traditional livelihoods for people when planning the 
project. More often than not, deals were sealed between the 
village leaders and the county governments unbeknownst to 
the villagers themselves (Guo 2001:430). In addition to an 
immediate decline in household incomes, the material free-
dom provided by the subsistence-based economy was also 
lost. Meanwhile, dependency on state institutions, in spite of 
lack of compensation, has been a major “unintended” conse-
quence.
CONCLUSION
Development in official discourse has primarily been de-
fined by predetermined goals: long-term social stability, re-
gional development, and modernization of the “backward 
periphery.” In Kangding, the thrust of development has been 
the construction of the new town, which, although assumed 
to improve the livelihood of the villagers, has sidelined their 
participation in various stages of the construction. The polar-
ized discrepancies between the official discourse and the local 
counter-discourse are thus prominent. When they deploy the 
concept of development, officials often tend to stress social 
stability (i.e., the absence of any form of protest), mineral re-
source extraction, accommodation of migrants, and above all, 
the strengthening of state institutions. The villagers, on the 
other hand, were preoccupied with their own everyday chal-
lenges of low income, unemployment and lack of housing. 
The new town per se was only secondary to them. Whenever 
beneficiaries are thus the people working within the state in-
stitutions. In the labour market created by these government 
projects, Chinese migrants enjoy better structural advantages, 
including language skills, comparatively higher education, 
and better connections or networks than the local Tibetans 
(Fischer 2005; Yeh 2006). 
The county government had contracted real estate com-
panies to build offices, residential blocks, and commercial 
apartments. However, the global financial crisis in the fol-
lowing year affected the housing market. Therefore, in order 
to attract “middle class” customers from Chengdu and other 
metropolises to buy houses in the new town, the local govern-
ment decided to subsidize buyers of apartments there (20,000 
Yuan to Kangding residents and 10,000 to outsiders) (Chen 
2009). The offer was available between May 1 and December 
31, 2009. The real estate companies were to also provide a 
series of preferential incentives such as free assistance service. 
The local government presented the apartments as potential 
“summer houses” for those who wished to flee the scorching 
heat in Chengdu and Chongqing. 
In official discourse, government officials represented the 
development of Simaqiao as a benevolent gesture to the “back-
ward”, “unstable”, and “traditionally minded” villagers, al-
though the villagers did not identify themselves as “backward” 
and “primitive.” Development was further constructed to be 
both “scientific” and “people-based.” Officials were convinced 
that the this project had served the people’s interest, although 
the villagers had experienced development as a disruption of 
their traditional subsistence livelihood, something that every 
villager interviewed would return to if given the choice. The 
“side effects” of development described by Ferguson apply 
here. According to Ferguson (1994), development projects 
produce regular and often unintended side effects such as the 
expansion of state power. In the process of urbanization, the 
villagers’ own rights and ability to shape development were 
significantly constrained while the state bureaucratic power 
expanded into the village. Contrary to the government’s rhet-
oric, the means of livelihood in the transformed community 
were far from secured. Instead of responding to the grievances 
of villagers, local officials attempted to achieve the targets and 
priorities established by their superiors. The official ideology 
of development thus masked some notable effects. First, with 
the invocation of “people-based” or “scientific” development, 
the official development discourse has systematically con-
cealed the direct and unintended outcomes of development, 
namely the expansion of urbanization at the expense of local 
villagers. Moreover, the participation of local people in de-
velopment was rarely mentioned as an alternative approach. 
Urbanization was perceived to be part of the “marketiza-
tion” (shichanghua) process, according to the local officials 
whom I interviewed. In other words, the village was mod-
ernized. Nonetheless, the lack of post-relocation livelihood 
opportunities has been a source of distress for landless villag-
ers. The implementation of the project had placed the (mostly 
Tibetan) villagers in limbo. They were no longer “villagers” 
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I discussed development with villagers, I noticed a sense of 
scepticism. Their resistance, however, cannot be interpreted 
as a rejection of the idea of development. On the contrary, 
villagers perceived development to be inherently good if car-
ried out with “pure” intention. Development programs could 
serve the interests of the people if they took into account their 
wishes and grievances. 
Top-down programs deprive villagers of their participa-
tion in planning. Villagers were portrayed as the “develop-
ment problem.” Ironically, the implementation had simul-
taneously depoliticized the project and portrayed it to be 
technically necessary for a number of reasons, particularly 
for political stability. The villagers, who the official discourse 
constructs as “backward” and “primitive”, were supposed to 
be the focus of development. However, their own experiences 
of development hardly correspond to the glittering official 
representations. The attempt to redefine the project in their 
own terms had met with very little success due to existing 
power relations. The aforementioned goals and development 
ideology deployed within the official discourse have, there-
fore, surprisingly little relevance to the actual wishes and de-
sires of the villagers.
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